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The Nature of Income Tax
By Charles F. Seeger

At present accountants differ as to the correct answer to the
question, “Are income taxes an expense or a distribution of
profits ?”
In some instances leading firms have treated such taxes as an
expense at the time of payment and for the current year. Other
cases have been dealt with by bringing into account a provision
for income taxes as an expense item for the period under review.
Some have even accrued income taxes in preparing monthly
interim statements in spite of the fact that the incidence of this
taxation upon going concerns, is entirely dependent upon the final
net results of an annual period.
Other accountants have held and still hold that income taxes
are a distribution of profits and as such, may, and should be
charged against the surplus of a corporation in the same manner
as dividends.
Available court decisions dealing with this question are con
flicting; the latest United States supreme court decision touching
on the subject has been construed to hold that income and profits
taxes are expenses of a corporation, yet the actual effect of the
complete decision is such as to require the treatment of income
and profits taxes as additional income to the shareholders. How
can an item be expense to a corporation and income to its share
holders?
It would seem that the matter is one worthy of serious atten
tion, so that if possible a uniform method of treatment may be
adopted in the preparation of financial statements.
The proper solution of the problem involves the application of
certain relevant economic and legal principles in combination with
generally accepted definitional explanation of the words “profit,
income, tax,” etc., upon which accounting procedure may be predi
cated with the assurance that a sound foundation, and not one of
mere opinion or expediency, exists.
At this point attention may well be directed to the following
lexigraphic views which assist in obtaining a clear conception of
the subject matter.
101

The Journal of Accountancy
The Standard dictionary gives, among others, this definition
of “profit”: “Value acquired over and above the value parted
with in the course of acquirement.” The following is given in
respect to “income”: “the amount of money coming to a person
or corporation within a specified time or regularly (when unquali
fied, annually), whether as payment for services, interest, or profit
from investment; revenue.” Appearing under the definition of
income, is the following definition of “income tax,” “a tax levied
upon the income or profits of individuals.” The meaning of levy
as expressed in the same dictionary is, in a legal sense, “(1) to
seize or take (property) by virtue of a judicial writ thereunto
commanding. (2) To impose or assess (a tax) on property and
collect it under authority of law.”
If the foregoing definitions are correct and controlling, then
income tax is that part of the profits seized or taken by govern
ment and is not a deductible expense in arriving at the amount of
profit made. Theoretically, most taxes are in the nature of a
seizure of a portion of property, as, for example, immediately
the tax is assessed the title to real estate is clouded until the lien
of taxation is removed.
Generally accepted economic laws and theory, with regard to
taxation, appear to support the definitions just given as well as
the resulting hypothesis. For instance, Ely, the economist, has
said, “Nowhere has there ever existed any such thing as absolute
private property. The rights of private individuals have always
been of a more or less limited nature, and among the rights
reserved by the people in their organic capacity will be found in
every civilized state the right to take, for such purposes as the
law-making power may deem fit, a portion of the wealth produced
by its citizens.” Another pertinent quotation from the same
source is, “Government, a partner in production—taxes have been
defended on still another ground. It is said that government par
ticipates in all production, and is as much a factor in the creation
of wealth as is land, labor or capital. . . . The argument con
tinues by asserting, that as government is a factor in production,
it is entitled to a share of the wealth produced.” This, too, is a
sound position, but it must not be overlooked that peculiar prin
ciples regulate the share of government. The portions which go
to land, to labor, and to capital are determined, in a great measure,
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by voluntary agreement, whereas government by virtue of its
own sovereignty determines what share it shall take.
In Principles of Economics Taussig states, “Then it is clearly
proper to provide that profits above a given rate of return on the
investment shall be divided with the state. The amount going to
the state in such case may be entitled a ‘tax’ or a ‘share.’ ”
Now if, according to broad economic principles, taxation is
based upon the right of people in their organic capacity to take a
portion of the wealth produced by its citizens, and the govern
ment is a partner in production and as such is entitled to a share
of the wealth produced and has a right to say what share it shall
take and if it is clearly proper to provide that profits shall be
divided with the state and the amount going to the state may be
properly entitled either as “tax” or a “share,” it would seem that
our income-tax laws come squarely within the purview of these
economic laws and certainly represent in the final analysis a dis
tribution or a division of profits and not an expense.
It must be admitted that the question has economic phases
which might appear to support the opposite view. For instance,
in discussing the subject of profits the economists incidentally
include, among the deductible items, taxes. This, however, does
not seem consistent with their viewpoint or construction of tax
ation as a share of profit to which the government is entitled. Is
it not possible that in defining profit in that manner the economists
have in mind the portion of profit which remains to the venture
after deducting the government’s preferred share?
It would be improper to attempt to decide the question sub
mitted without presenting the recent decisions of the federal courts
in the case of the Georgia Railway & Power Company vs. Rail
road Commission of Georgia.
This case had to do with the fixing of rates and was carried
to the federal courts by the power company. In establishing rates
the State Railroad Commission had allowed the Georgia Railway
& Power Company to charge its federal income taxes as a cost of
operation. Federal judges Bryan, Jack and Sibley, sitting as a
special tribunal, reversed the commission on this point in the
following language (Fed. Rep. Vol. 278, page 242) :
“But we disagree with the commission in allowing the
federal income tax as an expense of business. It is laid with
substantial uniformity on all persons and business, certainly
on all comparable to this. It is assessed on the net profit of
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business after it is done, and payable the following year. The
rate of it has often not been fixed until late in the year
affected. The acts laying the tax expressly declare it not to
be allowable as an expense of business for the purpose of
demanded by the government in return for its manifold
this tax. It is that part of the profit realized which is
services and protection. Though in some businesses the tax
has been added to the price and passed to the consumer, this
has not always been done. In banking and other moneylending businesses, usury laws were not relaxed because of
the income tax. Usurious interest is not legalized, because
the excess is to be paid over as income tax. Holders of
government securities above the exempted amounts at so low
a rate of returns as 4¼ per cent. must pay the tax out of it.
To permit law-controlled business to pass this tax to the
customer, except as it may come to be reflected in generally
higher returns obtained by invested capital would be to
subvert the policy of the law that imposes it, and, instead of
placing them on an equal footing with other investments of
capital of similar security and permanency, would be to give
them an advantage. It appearing that a net sum of $45,364.00
was distributed as normal federal income tax over the months
dealt with above in the accounting of operating expenses
and taxes, the above profits estimated for a year should be
increased by that sum, making $543,383.32 as the aggregate
result.”
The power company carried the case to the United States
supreme court, which, on June 11, 1923, affirmed the decision but
stated that the lower court erred in disallowing the federal taxes
as a deduction. Yet the supreme court did not positively class
the tax as an expense item but as either an expense or a charge in
calculating whether the rate did yield a proper return.
However, the supreme court further stated:
“It must be borne in mind as pointed out in the Galveston
Electric Company against City of Galveston, that, since
dividends from the corporation are not included in the income
on which the normal federal taxes are payable by stockholders,
the tax exemption is, in effect, an additional return on the
investment.”
The principle enunciated with regard to the deductibility of
federal taxes in both the Galveston and Georgia cases seems para
doxical, when compared with the actual effect of both decisions.
Considerable space has been given in the Students’ Depart
ment of The Journal of Accountancy to the question of
deductibility of federal taxes in determining a bonus.
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Anent the foregoing the following will be found in Mont
gomery’s Income-tax Procedure (page 276, 1920 edition, and
page 422, 1922 edition) :
“Should taxes be eliminated from profits in computing bonus?”
“In calculating the amount of tax to be paid by recipients
of commissions, bonuses, etc., which are based upon the profits
of a business or a department thereof, the question arises as
to the obligation, if any, of such recipients to assume a share
of the tax paid by the business. Payments of such commis
sions, etc., are expenses of the business and should be treated
as such by deducting them from gross income before stating
the net profits subject to excess profits and income taxes.
It follows, therefore, that since the payments referred to are
reported as allowable deductions, no tax of any kind has
been paid thereon by the business, but the recipients must
personally pay income taxes on any amounts they may receive,
subject, of course, to statutory exemptions, other income, etc.
Obviously, then, in the absence of any specific agreement to
the contrary, it would be unfair to the recipients to compute
such commissions, etc., on the income of the business after
deducting excess profits and income taxes.”
In the next two paragraphs, Montgomery continues this sub
ject, and inter alia states:
“In claiming the amount paid to the employe as a deduct
ible business expense, the employer may be said to assent to
the position that the employe is not liable to a tax based on
net income.”
As early as 1918 Montgomery’s Income-tax Procedure stressed
the point that income taxes are not an expense (page 302, 1918
edition).
However, Montgomery has straddled the fence because on
page 534 in volume 2 of Auditing Theory and Practice, published
recently, the following appears:

“Profit-sharing Plans,”
Distribution of earnings:
“When a distribution of a percentage of a net earning is
made, it becomes necessary to determine exactly what earn
ings and expense items should be included in a statement
prepared for the purpose, and whether the amount provided
for federal income and profits taxes should be deducted in
determining the net earnings. The taxes to be paid and the
amount of the profit-sharing distribution are affected each
by the other, since the latter is an allowable item of expense.
It is evident that the amount intended to be distributed is a
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part of the net profit which is available for dividends. The
average concern considers federal taxes as an expense which
is deducted in arriving at the net profit figure. It follows,
therefore, that unless otherwise provided, these taxes should
be considered before arriving at the amount on which the
distribution is based.”
The Students’ Department overlooked publishing a court
decision, squarely in point, which sustained the view that income
taxes are not deductible (unless so provided by contract) in
determining an employee’s profit-sharing bonus.
The decision (as taken from Montgomery) was as follows:
“Decision Edgar W. S. Reeder vs. G. Winthrop Coffin
and Quincy A. Gilmore, individually and as copartners, trad
ing as Coffin & Gilmore, Court of Common Pleas No. 3
(Philadelphia), June term, 1918. No. 3268. Extract from
opinion:
“We have considered the question of deduction of income
taxes before allowing the plaintiff 5 per cent. of the net profits
as salary. We do not think this deduction should be made,
as it is not in any way contemplated by the contract.”
A pamphlet issued recently by Prentice-Hall, Inc., entitled,
Profit-sharing Contracts, as affected by Federal and State Taxes,
yields the following:
“The recent decision in the case of Stanley vs. Leary,
et al., 199 New York supp., 617 (Supreme Court of New
York) sustains the view that, in the absence of specific agree
ment, the compensation should be calculated upon the profits
before any deduction for taxes.”
In this case the plaintiff was employed as sales manager for a
given salary plus a 5 per cent. commission computable annually
upon the net profits. The defendants were copartners. The
contract dated from January 1, 1914. The revenue act of 1917
imposed an excess-profits tax upon copartnerships.
The decision state inter alia:
“The defendants . . . made a profit of $204,459.97
during the year 1917. From this profit they paid a tax of
$86,576.35. In computing the amount due plaintiff, the
defendants first deducted the tax paid . . . and based
the amount of plaintiff’s commission on $117,883.62, the
difference between the profits earned by defendants and the
sum paid as taxes. . . . The income tax provisions were
enacted long after the agreement for compensation was made
between the parties. They could not, therefore, have con
templated that such a tax would be imposed. This fact as
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well as the provision in our law for the deductions of salary
and other compensation as expenses of the business before
the tax is paid may account for the contrary views expressed
in Patent Castings Syndicate, Lim., vs. Etherington (1 ch.
306). That ruling was based upon the English income
statute. It would seem, therefore, that inasmuch as the
amount of plaintiff’s commissions was deductible as an item
of expense, such computations should be based upon the
profits before any deduction for payment of taxes.”
Certain words have been underlined in the foregoing quota
tion for the purpose of emphasizing the court’s viewpoint, as
interpreted by the writer, to the effect that profits earned by a
concern are determined without first deducting income tax.
In the case of Schoettolkotte vs. Buckeye Cotton Oil Company,
heard by Chancellor Heiskell at Memphis, Tennessee, in January,
1923, it was decided that federal taxes were not deductible in
determining bonus. This case is pending before a higher court.
Other cases involving the same point are now before courts of
other states.
It is, therefore, apparent that in the calculation of bonuses
present court decisions uphold the calculation before the deduction
of the tax.
While the practical side of the problem ought not to control
the truth of the matter, nevertheless certain accounting difficulties
which arise if income taxes are considered an expense in either
rate or bonus determinations, cannot be lightly overlooked.
Copartnerships, as such, are not subject to this tax and it is
believed there is no legal inhibition to a copartnership owning and
operating a public utility which would be subject to statutory rate
regulation. Should a corporate public utility be entitled to higher
rates than one owned by a copartnership? While a public utility
owned by a copartnership or an individual might be profitable
such profit may have been offset by losses from other properties
as a consequence of which the owners would be subject to no tax.
Then the question of determining the charge for this tax in
fixing the rates of a public utility subsidiary to a larger holding
corporation which might be subject to the consolidated return rule
would seem difficult and especially so if the consolidated return
showed no tax.
Somewhat similar difficulties are present in bonus determina
tions. If federal or other income taxes are considered as an
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expense, different results will be gotten in calculating the bonus
if the employer is a corporation or a Massachusetts trust or a
copartnership or an individual.
The employee might be a new man in an old corporation which
made money for the first time in several years and after applying
previous losses the employer paid no federal tax. The question
then arises, “Would the employee be entitled to have the benefit of
the previous losses or should the bonus be calculated after deduct
ing the income tax which the employer would pay if there had
been no previous losses ?”
In the case of departmental heads employed on a bonus basis,
what intricate methods might be required to apportion federal and
state income taxes of a holding company to its subsidiaries and
their respective departments ?
In view of the foregoing economic, legal and practical aspects
of the situation; the fact that dividends are exempt from normal
income taxation; the consolidation rule applicable to many cor
porate groups, and the fact that two or more separate businesses
are not severally subject to income tax when owned by one
copartnership or individual, the logical conclusion is, that, in the
final analysis, income taxes are a distribution of profits and not
expense, and when assessed against a corporate body or group
constitute only payment of the shareholders’ tax at the source,
and, in effect, the courts have so held.
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